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Abstract 
We explore how cultural heterogeneity evolves without strong selection pressure or 
environmental differences between groups. Using a neutral transmission model with an 
isolation-by-distance spatiality, we test the effect of a simple representation of cultural 
‘memory’ on the dynamics of heterogeneity. We find that memory magnifies the effect of 
affinity while decreasing the effect of individual learning on cultural heterogeneity. This 
indicates that, while the cost of individual learning governs the frequency of individual 
learning, memory is important in governing its effect. 
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Effects of memory on spatial heterogeneity in neutrally transmitted culture 1 
 2 
Abstract 3 
 4 
We explore how cultural heterogeneity evolves without strong selection pressure or 5 
environmental differences between groups. Using a neutral transmission model with an 6 
isolation-by-distance spatiality, we test the effect of a simple representation of cultural 7 
‘memory’ on the dynamics of heterogeneity. We find that memory magnifies the effect of 8 
affinity while decreasing the effect of individual learning on cultural heterogeneity. This 9 
indicates that, while the cost of individual learning governs the frequency of individual 10 
learning, memory is important in governing its effect.  11 
 12 
1. Introduction 13 
 14 
From the foundations of human behavioural ecology (HBE), differences in cultural 15 
behavior have been explained as “forms of phenotypic adaptation to varying social and 16 
ecological conditions, using the assumption that natural selection has designed organisms 17 
to respond to local conditions in fitness-enhancing ways” (Boone and Smith 1998).  18 
 19 
Scaled up to group level, the HBE model characterises successful strategies as 20 
environment-specific and adaptive, enabling successful groups to out-reproduce competing 21 
groups (Henrich et al. 2006). When copying successful behaviours of the community 22 
benefits both individual and group, then cooperation can evolve in social networks 23 
extending beyond the limits of Hamiltonian inclusive fitness among kin (Henrich et al. 24 
2006; Hill et al. 2011; Hrdy 2009; Rendell et al. 2011). 25 
 26 
With new discoveries of cross-cultural variation in behaviours once assumed to be 27 
universal (see Nettle 2009a, 2009b), group-selection under different environments has 28 
become a more accepted phenomenon in HBE. Cross-cultural variation in the mean offers 29 
made in the Ultimatum Game, for example, has been explained through the different 30 
benefits of cooperation imposed by different modes of subsistence required in the 31 
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environment (Henrich et al. 2006). Norms of attractiveness, for another example, are also 32 
related to subsistence (and consequently environment), as humans under low resource 33 
conditions tend to be attracted to individuals of larger body mass index (Nettle 2009b). 34 
When attractiveness is enhanced by material culture, the stylistic variation may also be 35 
adaptive, by maintaining group identity. 36 
 37 
The actual details, however, of stylistic traits—such as linguistic dialects, decorative 38 
designs and details of folklore (Tehrani and Reide 2009; Evans and Levinson 2009; 39 
Kandler and Shennan 2013)—are not specific adaptations to local environment. Within-40 
group cooperation may be advantageous enough in itself—without resort to established 41 
models of kin selection, reputation, reciprocity or punishment (Nowak 2006)— such that 42 
cooperative norms can evolve among selfish agents modelled only to migrate toward 43 
successful communities and copy local strategies (Helbing and Wu 2009; Rand et al. 2009).    44 
  45 
As evidenced by cultural phylogenetics (Currie and Mace 2011; Fortunato and Jordan 46 
2009; Tehrani and Reide 2009), stylistic differences between communities in similar 47 
environments arise historically, due to chance events and migration over many generations. 48 
Even the cross-cultural variation in cooperative norms may be partly explained by 49 
demographic differences between groups rather than by their different environments 50 
(Lamba and Mace 2011). 51 
 52 
To account for historical contingency, over the past decade or so in the context of HBE 53 
(Winterhalder and Smith 2000; Nettle et al. 2013), it has become useful to distinguish 54 
"evoked culture" from "transmitted culture" (Nettle 2009). Whereas evoked culture is 55 
largely determined by environment, transmitted culture is governed by the dynamic 56 
equilibrium between social learning and individual learning, as individual learning is 57 
disseminated via social learning into evolving cultural traditions (Laland 2004; McElreath 58 
& Boyd 2007; Mesoudi 2008).  59 
 60 
Crucial to most dynamical models of transmitted culture is the ratio of independent versus 61 
social learners in dynamic equilibrium (Rogers 1995; Mesoudi 2008, 2011; Rendell et al. 62 
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2011).  This mixture can be reduced to a single variable for the fraction, µ, of individual 63 
learners in the population, and (1- µ) for social learners. Evolutionary theory predicts that 64 
social learners (1- µ) can increase in stable environments, and also naturally when the cost 65 
of individual learning, µ, is high (McElreath & Boyd 2007; Nettle 2009). These approaches 66 
assume a selective environment, one where the ‘fitness landscape’ has substantial peaks 67 
and individual learners produce the information needed by social learners (“scroungers”) 68 
to climb fitness peaks (Mesoudi 2008).  69 
 70 
Neutral models 71 
 72 
As a logical extreme, “neutral” models can explore cultural evolution on a ‘flat’ fitness 73 
landscape, when selective pressures are so weak as to be hypothetically absent. Concerning 74 
songbird communication for example, application of a neutral model would assume that in 75 
each generation "all subpopulations go through mutation, drift and migration, and all 76 
mutant forms are new to the region” (Lynch & Baker 1994: 354).  For chaffinches in the 77 
Azores, neutral drift within populations was a better explanation than migration for 78 
differences between populations (Lynch & Baker 1994). Among warblers of 79 
Massachusetts, elements of male-male competition songs were characterised by neutral 80 
drift but male-female courtship songs were not, confirming that courtship song elements 81 
were selected by the females (Byers et al. 2010).  82 
 83 
Comparing tree populations in Panama, Ecuador and Peru, Condit et al. (2005) found that 84 
within each region, the similarity (fraction of species shared in common) between small 85 
forest plots declined with increasing distance between them, most rapidly at small distances 86 
(3-5 km) and then much more slowly further out to 50km, such that similarity decayed 87 
linearly with the logarithm of the distance. Condit et al. (2005) found good agreement 88 
between these data and Hubbell’s (2001) neutral theory, in which they modeled a landscape 89 
of trees which have the same universal probability of death in any time step. When a tree 90 
dies, it is either (a) replaced by a copy (descendant) of a randomly-chosen neighbor from 91 
a random distance (chosen from a Gaussian distribution), or, with probability µ, replaced 92 
by a mutant tree of an entirely new species (Condit et al. 2005). This is the neutral model 93 
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situated in space, and the process is known as the Moran version because one agent (tree) 94 
at a time is selected for replacement.  95 
 96 
A substantial insight from such neutral models is that a predominant behavioural norm 97 
always emerges through unbiased copying, despite the lack of any fitness difference 98 
between the behavioural variants (Neiman 1995). Whatever behaviour emerges as 99 
predominant need not be any more adaptive than others, as it can emerge due to different 100 
chance histories of individual and social learning. This trend toward predominance is 101 
exhibited in the emergent right-skewed distributions of popularity, which closely resemble 102 
real data from social and economic contexts (Bentley, Ormerod, Batty 2011; Kandler and 103 
Shennan 2013; Ormerod 2012; Reali and Griffiths 2010). This historical contingency 104 
means that the same result is unlikely if we were to “replay the tape” of history.  The 105 
corresponding dynamic turnover in the right-skewed distributions of neutral options 106 
(Bentley et al. 2007; Eriksson et al. 2010) is another contrast with optimal adaptations that 107 
should not change until the environment changes.  108 
 109 
By removing fitness effects, the neutral model allows us to isolate the effects of three 110 
components, which we could briefly label as 1) the individual/social learning ratio, 2) 111 
distance and 3) memory.  112 
 113 
Regarding the individual/social learning ratio, neutral approaches typically model 114 
successive generations of agents of individual learners µ and social learners (1 - µ).  In the 115 
simplest of these neutral models, individual learning is modelled as random variation, and 116 
social learning is modelled through agents randomly sampling behaviours from the 117 
previous generation with equal probability (Neiman 1995).  More complex versions would 118 
impose biases or a network structure (Blythe 2012; Franz & Nunn 2009; Mesoudi and 119 
Lycett 2008; Ormerod et al. 2012).  120 
 121 
The invention parameter we use is strictly analogous to genetic mutation, but we see the 122 
parameter as closely related to the effect of individual learning, in the sense of Boyd and 123 
Richerson (1985), through trial and error experimentation, which effectively produces new 124 
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variants at specific locations.  New variants can also be created, however, through copying 125 
errors in the social learning process, so the invention parameter is not exactly a measure of 126 
individual learning. Nevertheless, we expect individual learning and ‘invention’ to be be 127 
strongly correlated, because each new variant qualifies as an invention. Also, to clarify our 128 
terms, if a new variant spreads (becomes widespread), the invention has become an 129 
innovation (O’Brien & Shennan 2010; Schumpeter 1934).  130 
 131 
To capture distance effects generally, we can incorporate assumptions of standard ‘gravity’ 132 
models and related ‘isolation by distance’ models. This involves a decay parameter that 133 
can be relaxed. Modern hyper-mobility can be translated into these same models when 134 
geographic space is transformed into transport network space (Grady et al. 2012). Note 135 
how this hypermobility contrasts with the trees modelled by Condit et al. (2005), whose 136 
distribution of mobility is Gaussian and exhibited a linear decline in similarity with eth 137 
logarithm of distance. We note also that distances also characterise social networks, which 138 
can be considered a form of ‘space’, broadly construed as physical, network or even design 139 
space.  140 
 141 
Memory is central to the unique human capacity for goal-directed problem-solving. This is 142 
another contrast with most ecological neutral models -- e.g. only living trees are ‘copied’ 143 
(Condit et al. 2005) – in which there is no ‘memory’ back to lost trees of past generations. 144 
Working memory, if simply defined as the "ability to maintain and manipulate thoughts 145 
over a brief period” (Wynn and Coolidge 2010: S8), is central to human language use, logic, 146 
emotional reasoning, general intelligence, visual and spatial attention, decision making, 147 
and planning (Baddley 2001; Wynn and Coolidge 2010). In our model, we consider the 148 
effects of cultural memory in a simplified representation, by which spatial location is 149 
chosen through neutral decision among many possible locations and, subsequently, the 150 
choice of behavior is then chosen from among local options.   Using the non-spatial neutral 151 
model, we previously found that adding memory imposes an ‘egalitarian’ bias on the 152 
popularity distribution, making it less right-skewed as memory is increased while holding 153 
invention rate constant (Bentley et al. 2011).  The effects of memory on spatial 154 
heterogeneity, however, were not explored.  This motivates us to explore how memory 155 
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affects, in turn, the effect of the fraction µ of individual learners on cultural drift or the 156 
strength of isolation-by-distance effects.  157 
  158 
Our first hypothesis is that increasing µ will increase cultural heterogeneity, by injecting 159 
local variation that can be preserved through isolation by distance. Our second hypothesis 160 
is that long memory would tend to preserve cultural heterogeneity especially under strong 161 
isolation by distance. 162 
 163 
2. Methods 164 
 165 
The model proceeds in a series of repeated iterations. We start with a fixed number of 166 
‘locations’ that could be interpreted as geographical locations, or more generally as social 167 
locations. At a given point in time t, a number, nt, of new agents enter the model.  Each of 168 
these nt agents makes two decisions.  Firstly, the agent selects a location and secondly it 169 
then has to choose amongst the alternative cultural traits available at that location.  Agents 170 
make each of these choices through random sampling, i.e., with probability proportional to 171 
the frequency of the choice among existing agents. In every period, every agent either 172 
learns socially from previously available options (with probability 1 – µ), or learns 173 
individually by inventing something entirely new (with probability µ). 174 
 175 
More formally, the algorithm is described by the flowchart in Figure 1. At each time t, a 176 
set number of agents nt enter the model. Each agent Ai,t , i.e. the i-th agent to enter the model 177 
at time t for i = 1,…, nt, selects a location Li,t from k possible locations which follow a 178 
multinomial distribution with probabilities proportional to the number of agents in any 179 
given location that entered the model in the last m steps. Once agent Ai,t is assigned to its 180 
location Li,t, it chooses a previously selected cultural trait Pi,t based on preferential 181 
attachment or chooses a new trait with probability µ, which we call the invention parameter. 182 
If the agent chooses to not innovate, its choice is also influenced by its memory m, i.e. the 183 
agent will take into account decisions made by all agents that entered the model in the 184 
previous m time steps, and by the influence of other locations in its own.  185 
 186 
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We measure the influence of one population into another by a k-by-k matrix W where Wi,j 187 
describes the influence of the ith location in the jth location. Therefore, given that the agent 188 
chose not to innovate, cultural trait choices follow a multinomial distribution with 189 
probability vector given by the proportion of agents that selected each trait in each location 190 
within the last m time steps and reweighted by matrix W to account for the effect of 191 
distance.  192 
 193 
________________________ 194 
Figure 1 195 
________________________ 196 
 197 
The universal ‘memory’ parameter, m, which takes integer values from one time step 198 
previous to all previous time steps, specifies how much previous history agents take into 199 
account in terms of the choices others have made (Bentley et al. 2011).  The memory 200 
parameter m specifies that the decisions made by the agents that entered the model in the 201 
previous m steps will influence the decision of new agents.  In addition to the choices that 202 
an agent has made previously at its own location, the agent can also be influenced by the 203 
choices made at the other locations.  The importance that the agent assigns to these, relative 204 
to the importance of agents at its own location, will vary according to how distant the other 205 
locations are.  If the number of agents that enter the model at each time step is sufficiently 206 
large, we can focus on exploring the impact of memory on the individual learning factors.  207 
 208 
The invention parameter µ refers to the probability with which a specific agent will deviate 209 
from the norm and select a trait that was not previously selected in its own location.  This 210 
does not necessarily mean that the chosen behaviour is new in the global context of the 211 
system, it only means it is new to the local dimension.  212 
 213 
Finally, the influence matrix W assigns weights to the different levels of influence that 214 
choices made by agents in other locations might have in the agent’s own location. Here we 215 
focus on outcomes when the off-diagonal elements of the influence matrix, W, are non-216 
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zero.   In particular, we are interested in the degree of homogeneity in the aspects of cultural 217 
behaviour, which emerges across the different locations.  If, for example, agents pay equal 218 
weight to trait choices at every location, not just their own, then the outcome will be 219 
completely homogeneous, the relative frequency of the various alternative traits will be the 220 
same at every location. 221 
 222 
Consider now, for example, when the influence of location i on location j is assumed to 223 
decay exponentially with the square of the distance, as is illustrated in Figure 2. 224 
 225 
________________________ 226 
Figure 2 227 
________________________ 228 
 229 
The formula for the curves is 230 
𝑊𝑖,𝑗 = exp⁡(−𝜆⁡𝑑
2(𝑖, 𝑗))         (1) 231 
 232 
where d(i,j) is the distance between locations i and  j.  233 
 234 
The special case of λ = ∞ has already been explored, as in this case agents only take into 235 
account the decisions of agents at their own location (Bentley et al. 2011). This reduces to 236 
the non-spatial version of the neutral model, with the diagonal elements of the matrix W 237 
equal to one and all other values zero.  This non-spatial neutral model generates an entire 238 
family of non-Gaussian, right-skewed popularity distributions, including exponential, 239 
power law tails of varying exponents, and power laws across the whole data (Bentley et al. 240 
2010; Evans 2007; Mesoudi and Lycett 2009; Strimling et al. 2009), and also a ‘winner-241 
takes-all’ result when there is no invention at all, i.e. μ = 0 (Neiman 1995). In addition, the 242 
model produces the continuous turnover of rankings of popularity observed empirically 243 
within these distributions (Bentley et al. 2007; Eriksson et al. 2010; Evans and Giometto 244 
2011). 245 
 246 
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Our approach here is to build on these results by exploring finite values of λ. For small 247 
values of λ, which we describe as the affinity parameter, the influence of other locations on 248 
the choice made by an agent declines rapidly with distance. This distance need not be 249 
physical, it could also be a network distance, for example (Grady et al. 2012). We measure 250 
the level of homogeneity in the popularity of choices, which emerges across the different 251 
locations as follows.  We run the model for a 1000 time steps, for a given triplet of values 252 
for the memory, invention and affinity parameters, with 1000 agents entering the model at 253 
each time step.  254 
 255 
In order to assess the level of homogeneity between locations, we calculate the correlations 256 
of cultural trait distributions between locations at time τ and propose the following measure 257 
of similarity 258 
𝑆 =
1
𝑘(𝑘−1)
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝜏, 𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝜏)1≤𝑖<𝑗≤𝑘        (2) 259 
where k is the number of different locations and 𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝜏 is a vector that represents the relative 260 
proportions of different traits in the ith location after τ time steps.  Each element of this 261 
vector represents one of the possible choices, and the vector is long enough to include the 262 
maximum possible number of different choices by the end of the run (τµnt + nt), which at 263 
each location may include zeros for absent choices.  The similarity measure S lies within 264 
the interval [-1,1]. When S equals 1, we have total similarity, or in other words global 265 
homogeneity. When S approaches 0, we have maximum heterogeneity. When S is negative, 266 
then the choices in pairwise comparisons tend to be anti-correlated, and as S approaches -267 
1 they comparisons yield completely contradictory choices between each pair. 268 
 269 
In the results that we report here, the locations are placed around a circle.  They could 270 
equally be placed at random, or in a network.  All that we need is a measure if distance 271 
between every pair. We repeat the experiment 100 times for the given parameter triplet.   272 
Experimentation suggests that this number is more than adequate to assume convergence 273 
occurs. We start with k =100 locations and τ = 1000 time steps. Concerning the invention 274 
fraction, we vary μ from 0.005 to 0.05, which is consistent with previous studies that 275 
consider mutation rates from μ = 0.001 to 0.1 (e.g., Lynch and Baker 1994) and similar to 276 
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ranges proposed for human invention (e.g., Eerkens and Lipo 2005; Diederen et al. 2003; 277 
Srinivasan and Mason 1986; Rogers 1964). 278 
 279 
3. Results 280 
 281 
To illustrate the character of the results, we first show them for low values of both memory 282 
m and invention fraction μ and for single solutions of the model. We therefore set m = 1 283 
and μ = 0.005.  Figure 3 shows both the weight matrix, W, and the correlation matrix used 284 
to calculate S for λ = 1, and Figure 3b sets λ = 10.  These are illustrative results from a 285 
single simulation of the model.  The locations are placed on a circle, so for location 1, its 286 
nearest neighbours are location 2 on one side, and location 100 on the other.    287 
________________________ 288 
Figure 3 289 
________________________ 290 
 291 
The parameter values m = 1 and μ = 0.005, as already noted, generate solutions which 292 
approach ‘winner-takes-all’ when agents at a location only take account of agents at the 293 
same location.   Setting λ = 1 means that agents assign a high weight to the decisions of a 294 
number of neighbours when choosing from the alternatives available.  This means that the 295 
same cultural trait emerges as the ‘winner’ at all locations.  There is high correlation 296 
between outcomes at any pair of locations. 297 
 298 
Figure 4 presents illustrative results for a single solution for the same parameters as in 299 
Figure 3, except with a much stronger decay of influence with distance, λ = 10.  The chart 300 
for the weight matrix in Figure 3b, when contrasted with that in Figure 3a, shows that 301 
agents at any given location pay much less attention to decisions made at other locations. 302 
________________________ 303 
Figure 4 304 
________________________ 305 
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At any given location, the solution is similar to ‘winner-takes-all’, but the trait that wins 306 
now differs across the individual locations. This difference is strongest between location 307 
pairs coloured blue in Figure 3b (right).   Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the impact of varying λ, 308 
one of the parameters in the triplet (m, μ, λ) in a single solution.  We now illustrate how 309 
varying (m, μ, λ) impacts the similarity measure S; in each case, we fix the memory and 310 
invention parameters and simulate the model 100 times for values of λ from 1 to 50.   311 
 312 
Figure 5 shows the average of the similarity measure across 100 solutions of the model for 313 
given values of m and μ when λ is varied. The top two curves show the results when 314 
memory is short, in each case m = 1, and the bottom two show results with longer memory 315 
when m = 10. There is a strong tendency towards homogeneity across the system when 316 
memory is short and the level of homogeneity, or similarity, declines as the rate of 317 
invention increases.    318 
 319 
These results confirm the illustrative results from a single simulation set out in Figures 3 320 
and 4.  For example, the red and the green curves in Figure 5 both have μ = 0.005. The 321 
curves illustrate quite clearly the importance of memory in the model. For any given value 322 
of the affinity parameter, there is considerably more cultural homogeneity when memory 323 
is smaller. Higher values of memory mean that, if differences arise in the distribution of 324 
cultural traits between locations during the process of solving the model, they have a 325 
stronger tendency to persist. 326 
________________________ 327 
Figure 5 328 
________________________ 329 
 330 
We also find that the effect of invention on the degree of similarity between locations 331 
declines markedly as memory is increased. Consider the green and yellow curves in Figure 332 
5. In each case m = 1, and μ = 0.005 and 0.05 respectively. The outcomes are clearly 333 
different. For small values of the memory parameter, the higher the invention parameter is, 334 
the less the overall degree of similarity. Consider now the red and blue curves, where and 335 
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μ = 0.005 and 0.05 respectively. However, memory is now set at a distinctly higher value, 336 
m = 10. In this case, the impact of varying invention is almost eliminated. With a long 337 
memory, the impact of previous choices on an agent’s decision about which cultural trait 338 
to adopt is higher.  339 
 340 
In summary, the similarity measure is impacted by the various parameters in the following 341 
ways: 342 
 High values of the affinity parameter, for any given values of invention and 343 
memory, mean that an agent assigns low weights to decisions taken by agents in 344 
different locations.  The higher the affinity parameter, λ, the lower the similarity, in 345 
other words the more culturally heterogeneous is the outcome;  346 
 For given values of the affinity parameter, the lower the memory, the higher the 347 
degree of similarity, in other words the higher the degree of cultural homogeneity; 348 
 The lower the value of the invention parameter, μ, the higher the degree of 349 
similarity.  However, as memory increases, the effect of varying the invention 350 
parameter becomes much less noticeable. 351 
4. Discussion 352 
 353 
In exploring how cultural heterogeneity evolves, memory is important. In smaller societies, 354 
collective cultural memory provides a means for humans to situate themselves in their 355 
cultural niche and thus cooperate (Pinker 2010). Memory of past observations and 356 
encounters allows individuals to anticipate the consequences of future decisions (Giguère 357 
and Love 2013; Olivola and Sagara 2009; Stewart et al. 2006). Shared knowledge of other 358 
people's feelings helps preserve social relationships amid continual complex negotiations 359 
of cooperation (Pinker et al. 2008). Among the !Kung San of the Kalahari Desert, for 360 
example, names designate whether two people have a joking relationship or an avoidance 361 
relationship (Marshall 1957), which is adaptive for mobile people who may encounter 362 
distant relatives infrequently. 363 
We have found that memory is also important in our modelling of cultural heterogeneity 364 
under neutral evolution situated in space. Compared to spatial neutral models in an 365 
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ecological context without memory (Condit et al. 2005), or cultural neutral models in which 366 
the current generation copies from individuals in the previous generation (Neiman 1995; 367 
Shennan and Wilkinson 2001; Bentley et al. 2011), it seems appropriate to add memory for 368 
cultural phenomena. Cultural variants can be passed between distant generations either 369 
directly—when grandma tells a story, so to speak—or when preserved through material 370 
culture, written media, or even different cultural groups in which older variants have not 371 
yet gone extinct.  372 
 373 
Before simulating this spatial neutral model with memory, our hypotheses were that 374 
increasing individual learning fraction µ would promote spatial heterogeneity, increasing 375 
memory m, and/or strengthening isolation by distance by increasing λ. Although it seemed 376 
reasonable at the outset that, under neutral transmission, modelling cultural memory might 377 
possibly help to preserve local unique inventions and thus increase the effect of individual 378 
learning variation on heterogeneity, our modelling shows that, to the contrary, the longer 379 
the memory m, the less likely cultural homogeneity was to emerge. In retrospect it appears 380 
that this is because increasing the memory parameter decreases the relative visibility of a 381 
new invention, as increasing m increases the number of choices available to an agent 382 
entering the model. Short memory means that cultural traits frequently drop out and 383 
become unavailable, because no-one has chosen them in the relevant time frame.  With m 384 
= 1, for example, unless a trait has been chosen in the previous time step, it drops out of 385 
the system, no matter how many times it has been selected previous to this.  With longer 386 
memory, however, more traits remain to be selected, and hence the relative size of 387 
‘invention pool’, the number of new alternatives created, becomes very small compared to 388 
the number of existing traits. 389 
 390 
Regarding individual learning fraction and isolation by distance, our results were more 391 
complex than our hypotheses because their effects were not independent of memory. We 392 
find that increasing memory m magnifies the effect of changing the affinity λ, but it 393 
decreases the effect of individual learning fraction µ. Similar to isolation by distance 394 
models, our spatially-aggregated similarity measure decreases as the affinity parameter is 395 
increased, but this inverse relationship becomes markedly steeper when memory is 396 
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increased.  With low memory, for a given value of affinity, increasing invention rate 397 
decreases aggregated similarity by introducing random variation.  At higher memory 398 
values, however, this effect of invention rate vanishes, i.e. even an increase by an order of 399 
magnitude in inventiveness has negligible effect under high memory.  400 
 401 
5. Conclusions  402 
 403 
We have shown one basic means by which cultural heterogeneity can evolve under a 404 
neutral drift process with memory. This is not in any way meant as a universal explanation, 405 
but as substantiation of a powerful alternative hypothesis to selective adaptation to different 406 
environments. While it is well established that population size and the individual/social 407 
learning ratio are central to neutral evolution, we find that some simple representation of 408 
memory increases isolation by distance but decreases the effect of individual learning on 409 
cultural heterogeneity. More complex treatments of memory in neutral models, not to 410 
mention forward-looking cognitive processes, could underlie new studies of cultural drift 411 
contrasting past and present. 412 
 413 
The effect of changes in the time scale of this memory is a pertinent evolutionary question, 414 
as the Internet paradoxically combines permanent storage of information with shorter 415 
attention spans. Over the generational scale, written language accumulates technological 416 
knowledge but also regenerates the cultural basis by which people make sense of their own 417 
experience, maintain social relationships, and devise scenarios for problem-solving (Carrol 418 
1995; Pinker et al. 2008).  It is certainly plausible that information overload is making 419 
neutral evolution models more relevant. For the sake of argument, suppose that the Internet 420 
makes memory m longer while decreasing isolation by distance λ. How learning fraction µ 421 
is changing online is an exciting research question. Other neutral models may incorporate 422 
agents with memory, and also with forward expectations (Gureckis and Goldstone 2009). 423 
This might be asymmetrically weighed, as experiments suggest people expect less change 424 
over the next decade than they report experiencing over the past decade (Quoidbach et al. 425 
2013).  426 
 427 
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In any case, these changes in memory and individual invention rate brought about by online 428 
media surely contrast with millennia of cultural evolution that allowed humans to 429 
accumulate information and learn skills over many generations (Henrich 2004; Hruschka 430 
et al. 2009; Powell et al 2009). As economist Thomas Schelling put it, most human life 431 
consists of individuals responding to a context of other individuals’ responses to other 432 
individuals. As humans adapt themselves to a `cognitive niche' of other knowledge-using 433 
and cooperative individuals (Pinker 2010), we might consider memory to be the depth of 434 
that niche, contemporary population as its length and width, and invention as the ultimate 435 
driver of change within it. 436 
 437 
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Figure legends 574 
 575 
Figure 1. Flowchart representing the algorithm described in Section 2. Here we show the solution 576 
for any weight matrix W. In the examples described throughout this paper, we use W as described 577 
in Equation 1. 578 
 579 
Figure 2. For a given location, the weight assigned by an agent to the choices made in 580 
other locations.  Distance on the x-axis and the y-axis shows the weight.  581 
 582 
Figure 3. Weak decay by distance (λ =1). Left: weight matrix, W, for λ =1, m = 1 and μ = 583 
0.005.  The axes show the location number (note that locations are in a circle, so location 584 
100 is adjacent to location 1). The colour codes show the weight associated between each 585 
location pair.  Right: the correlation matrix between the cultural trait distributions in each 586 
location.  Note all correlations between location pairs are high and the calculated S measure 587 
for this simulation is 0.99. 588 
 589 
Figure 4. Strong decay by distance (λ =10). Left: the weight matrix, W, for λ =10, m = 1 590 
and μ = 0.005.  The axes show the location number.  The colour codes show the weight 591 
associated between each location pair.  Right: the correlation matrix between the cultural 592 
trait distributions in each location.  The calculated S measure for this simulation is 0.10. 593 
 594 
Figure 5. Average of the similarity S, as a function of influence decay parameter λ, across 595 
100 solutions of the model for several combinations of m and μ. Red: m = 10, μ = 0.005;  596 
Blue : m = 10, μ = 0.05; Yellow: : m = 1, μ = 0.05;Green: : m = 1, μ = 0.005.  597 
Agents 𝐴1,1, 𝐴2,1, …, 𝐴𝑛1,1 enter the model
For 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛1
Agent 𝐴𝑖,1 selects location 𝐿𝑖,1 from k 
possible locations each with probability  1 𝑘.
Agent 𝐴𝑖,1 selects cultural trait 𝑃𝑖,1 from p 
possible products each with probability  1 𝑝.
𝑡 > 1
For 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑡
Agent 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 selects location 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 from k possible locations, 
each location l with probability proportional to
where 1 is the indicator function.
 
max(0,𝑡−𝑚)≤𝑠<𝑡
1≤𝑗≤𝑛𝑠
𝟏 𝐿𝑗,𝑠 = 𝑙
Agent 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 doesn’t innovate. In a given location 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡
selects cultural trait 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 from p possible traits, each product 
q with probability proportional to
The number of traits p equals the number of cultural traits 
available in the previous m time steps.
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 innovates
𝑝 ≔ 𝑝 + 1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = p+1 
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